added concept IMA

resources/measurements.fig

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thesis/03_concept.tex

@@ -122,6 +122,36 @@ Consequently only a \emph{known} Kernel with a \emph{known} hardware and firmwar
 The disk encryption is, however, only an optional feature which can be omitted in a production environment when there is no sensible data on the disk that must not be revealed to the public.
 The system needs to check its integrity on the OS level and summarize that by publishing an attestation message, before any transaction data is used.
 
+\begin{figure}
+	\centering
+	\includegraphics[width=0.8\linewidth]{../resources/measurements.pdf}
+	\caption{Extending trust from the Roots of Trust up to the Kernel}%
+	\label{fig:measuements}
+\end{figure}
+
+\autoref{fig:measuements} illustrates how above proceses extend the trust on the system.
+The TPM is the cryptographic root of trust, storing all measurement results and the target values for validation.
+SInce the RTM is the only piece of code, which lives in the platform firmware and is executed \emph{before} it is measured, it is an important part in the trust architecture of the system.
+An honest RTM will measure the binary representation of itself, which makes the code at least provable afterwards.
+Finally, the CPU is assumed to execute all the code according to its specification.
+Proving correctness of the instruction set cannot be done during the boot process.
+
+When the roots of trust are honest, the trusted environment can be constructed during booting the platform with the PCR measurements.
+We get then a system, where all active parts in the booting process are trusted up to the Linux kernel with its extensions and execution parameters.
+
+\subsection{Integrity and Trust in the OS}%
+\label{sub:integrity_and_trust_in_the_os}
+
+With the trusted kernel, we can extend the trusted environment on the file system with IMA.
+According to \autoref{sec:integrity_measurement_architecture}, every file will be hashed once IMA is activated and configured accordingly.
+By enforcing IMA, only files with a valid hash will be accessed by the kernel, assuming the whole file system to be analyzed accordingly.
+
+After setting up the system, IMA will \texttt{fix} the attributes of all relevant files and finally be \texttt{enforced}.
+The IMA policy in place should be \texttt{appraise\_tcb}, to analyze kernel modules, executable memory mapped files, executables and all files opened by root for read.
+
+\subsection{Prove Trust with DAA}%
+\label{sub:prove_trust_with_daa}
+
 
 
 \begin{figure}
@@ -177,8 +207,6 @@ Trusted Boot is not the same as Secure Boot. Explain the difference
 \label{ssec:tpm12}
 Initial Version of the crypto-coprocessor, successfully spread into many systems, but hardly any integration in Trust/security Software
 
-
-
 \begin{figure}
 	\centering
 	\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{../resources/tpmattest}