masterthesis/thesis/03_concept.tex

\chapter{Concept}
\label{cha:concept}
The theoretical tool that should be formed to one whole system implementation in this thesis.
\section{Definition of the Biometric Sensor}
\label{definitions}
What part fulfills the BS and what needs to be done.
Record Sensor data, Network Discovery, send sensor data via trusted channel to PIA

\subsection{What has the BS to do?}
\label{sec:bs-usecase}
\begin{enumerate}
	\item Listen for a Trigger to start the Authentication Process
	\item Collect Sensor Data (Picture, Fingerprint) and calculate a biometric representation
	\item Start Network Discovery and find the PIA of this person
	\item Create a trusted and secure channel and transmit the attributes for verification
	\item Restore the state of the system as it was before this transaction
\end{enumerate}

\section{Attack Vectors and Threat Model}
The Biometric Sensor will work in an exposed environment.
Neither the user providing biometric data nor the network environment should be trusted for proper function.
There should only be a connection to the Digidow network for transmitting the recorded data.
This assumption of autonomy provides independence to the probably diverse target environments and use cases.

In addition to autonomy, the Biometric Sensor should also ensure proper handling of received and generated data.
The recorded dataset from a sensor is \emph{sensitive data} due to its ability to identify an individual (Who?). 
Due to its narrow definition, it is affordable to protect sensitive data.
Besides that, \emph{metadata} is information generated during the whole transaction phase. 
Timestamps and host information are metadata as well as connection lists, hash sums and log entries and much more (What? Where? When?)
There exists no exact definition or list of metadata which makes it hard to prevent any exposure of it.
Metadata does not directly identify an individual.
However huge notwork providers are able to combine lots of metadata to traces of individuals.
Eventually an action of those traced individuals might unveil their identity. 
Consequently, a central goal of Digidow is to minimize the amount to minimize the risk of traces.

Privacy defines the ability of individuals to keep information about themselves private from others.
In context to the Biometric Sensor, this is related to the recorded biometric data.
Furthermore, to prevent tracking. any interaction with a Sensor should not be matched to personal information.
Only the intended and trusted way of identification within the Digidow network should be possible.

\subsection{Threat Model}
\label{ssec:threatmodel}

To fulfill the Sensor's use case in an exposed environment, we need to consider the following attack vectors.
\begin{itemize}
	\item \emph{Rogue Hardware Components}: Modified components of the Biometric Sensor could, depending on their contribution to the system, collect data or create a gateway to the internal processes of the system. 
		Although the produced hardware piece itself is fine, the firmware on it is acting in a malicious way.
		This threat addresses the manufacturing and installation of the system.
	\item \emph{Hardware Modification}: Similar to rogue hardware components, the system could be modified in the target environment by attaching additional hardware.
		With this attack, adversaries may get direct access to memory or to data transferred from or to attached devices,
	\item \emph{Metadata Extraction}: The actual sensor like camera or fingerprint sensor is usually attached via USB or similar cable connection. 
		It is possible to log the protocol of those attached devices via Man in the Middle attack on the USB cable.
	\item \emph{Attribute Extraction}: The actual sensor like camera or fingerprint sensor is usually attached via USB or similar cable connection. 
		It is possible to log the protocol of those attached devices via wiretapping the USB cable. 
		With that attack, an adversary is able to directly access the attributes to identify individuals.
	\item \emph{Modification or aggregation of sensitive data within Biometric Sensor}: The program which prepares the sernsor data for transmission could modify the data before sealing it.
		The program can also just save the sensible data for other purposes. 
	\item \emph{Metadata extraction on Network}: During transmission of data from the sensor into the Digidow network, there will be some metadata generated.
		An adversary could use this datasets to generate tracking logs and eventually match these logs to individuals.
	\item \emph{Retransmission of sensor data of a rogue Biometric Sensor}: When retransmitting sensor data, the authentication of an individual could again be proven.
		Any grants provided to this individual could then given to another person.
	\item \emph{Rogue Biometric Sensor blocks transmission}: By blocking any transmission of sensor data, any transaction within the Digidow network could be blocked and therefore the whole authentication process is stopped.
	\item \emph{Rogue Personal Identity Agent}: A rogue PIA might receive the sensor data instead of the honest one.
		Due to this error, a wrong identity and therefore false claims would be made out of that.
\end{itemize}

Given this threat model and the use cases described in \autoref{sec:bs-usecase}, we will introduce an approach to minimize most of the attack vectors.

\begin{itemize}
	\item DONE Definition of sensitive data / privacy / metadata
	\item This version of BS is not owned by the user, there is no personal data in the System
	\item Rogue Personal Identity Agent (PIA)
	\item Metadata Extraction
	\item Attribute extraction
	\item Sensor Data Modification/manipulation
	\item Wiretap between Sensor and System (USB or network)
	\item Physical Manipulation of the BS-System
	\item Network - Retransmission of sensor data of a rogue BS
	\item Network - Blocking Data transmission of a rogue BS
	\item Rogue BS Sensor Data aggregation
	\item Rogue BS Sensor data modification before transmission
\end{itemize}
\section{Trust and Security}
\label{sec:trust}
Trust is an essential term in this thesis.
In the world of IT security, the term \emph{trusted computing} defines a secured environment where special or confidential computing jobs are dispatched.
This environment or product usually meets the following requirements
\begin{itemize}
	\item \emph{Minimalization.} The number of features and hence the complexity must be as low as possible.
	\item \emph{Sound definitions.} Every function should be well defined. There should be no margin for interpretation left. Security Engineers should be involved in the development. 
	\item \emph{Complete testing.} Testing for trusted computing includes a threat analysis and exhaustive testing if possible. 
\end{itemize}
Since software and hardware testing is never complete, it is hard to find a good balance between feature set and testing completeness.

However trust in IT is not equal to security.
It defines a subset of IT security where this small well defined environment is embedded in a larger system which is usually untrusted.
Claiming a system \emph{secure} spans the constraints of trust over the complete system, which is not affordable for commodity computers these days.
However it is possible to use the trusted environment to get some guarantees on the untrusted parts of a system as well
In Chapter 3 we will show how trust will be extended in a commodity PC.
%TODO reference to TPM section how to extend trust into untrusted parts of PC

%TODO describe verifiable trust in addition to the previous definition (with example of the ATM?)


Differentiation between trust and security --- and the problem that not everyone is using that right.
\section{Systems of Trust}
\label{sec:trustsystems}
All trust systems are built on the standards of Trusted Computing Group.
\subsection{Secure Boot, TXT, \ldots}
\label{ssec:secureboot-txt}
Trusted Boot is not the same as Secure Boot. Explain the difference
\subsection{TPM1.2}
\label{ssec:tpm12}
Initial Version of the crypto-coprocessor, successfully spread into many systems, but hardly any integration in Trust/security Software



\begin{figure}
	\centering
	\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{../resources/tpmattest}
	\caption[DAA Attestation procedure]{The DAA attestation process requires 5 steps. The PIA may trust the Biometric Sensor afterwards.}
	\label{fig:daa-attestation}
\end{figure}

\section{Trusted Boot}

\section{Integrity Measurements}
As described in the previous section, when the boot process is eventually finished, the OS is then responsible for extending the chain of trust.
Given a valid trusted boot procedure, the binary representation of the kernel is already measured.
Therefore the Kernel itself has the responsibility to keep track of everything happening on the platform from the OS point of view.

Soon after the first TPM standard was published, the \emph{Integrity Measurement Architecture} (IMA) for the Linux Kernel was introduced.
Since Kernel 3.7 it is possible to use all IMA features, when the compiler options of the Kernel are set correspondingly.

IMA 


Extend the Chain of Trust beyond the boot process.
The Kernel can measure many different types of Resources.
What is a useful set of measurements

\section{Verify Trust with DAA}

\subsection{DAA History}
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic protocol, which aims to provide evidence that a device is a honest member of a group without providing any identification information.
Brickell, Camenisch and Chen\cite{BriCamChe04} introduce DAA and implement the protocol for the TPM 1.2 standard.
However it supports only RSA and has limitations in verifying attestation signatures.
Hence, DAA is not used with the TPM 1.2 standard.

Since the DAA protocol is quite complex, it is difficult to provide a sound security model for DAA and formally prove the security properties of it.
Chen, Morissey and Smart\cite{chen09} add linkability to the protocol.
Their approach for a formal proof is not correct, since a trivial key can be used for pass verification\cite{camenisch16}


%TODO Chronic of DAA until Camenisch16, Discussion about broken Proofs in previous papers.

Camenisch, Drijvers and Lehmann\cite{camenisch16} developed a DAA scheme for the new TPM 2.0 standard.
It supports linkability and the proves for security and correctness still hold.
Furthermore, RSA and ECC cryptography is supported which makes it practicable for a wider variety of use cases.
However, Camenisch et al.\@ proposed a fix in the TPM 2.0 API to guarantee all requirements necessary for DAA.
Xaptum implemented this DAA-variant including the fixes in the TPM API.
The implementation will be discussed in Chapter 4.%TODO Reference to Xaptum discussion

Analyzing the security and integrity of this scheme would exceed the scope of this thesis.
Hence this thesis describes the DAA protocol and assumes the correctness and integrity.

%TODO: Discussion: sid removed, RL only works with private keys, etc.