\chapter{Concept}
The theoretical tool that should be formed to one whole system implementation in this thesis.
\section{Definition of the Biometric Sensor}
What part fulfills the BS and what needs to be done.
Record Sensor data, Network Discovery, send sensor data via trusted channel to PIA
\subsection{Definitions}
\begin{itemize}
	\item Sensitive Data
	\item Privacy
	\item Metadata
	\item Attribute
\end{itemize}

\subsection{What has the BS to do?}
\begin{enumerate}
	\item Listen for a Trigger to start the Authentication Process
	\item Collect Sensor Data (Picture, Fingerprint) and calculate a biometric representation
	\item Start Network Discovery and find the PIA of this person
	\item Create a trusted and secure channel and transmit the attributes for verification
	\item Restore the state of the system as it was before this transaction
\end{enumerate}

\section{Attack Vectors and Threat Model}
\subsection{The Threat Model}
\begin{itemize}
	\item Definition of sensitive data / privacy / metadata
	\item This version of BS is not owned by the user, there is no personal data in the System
	\item Rogue Personal Identity Agent (PIA)
	\item Metadata Extraction
	\item Attribute extraction
	\item Sensor Data Modification/manipulation
	\item Wiretap between Sensor and System (USB or network)
	\item Physical Manipulation of the BS-System
	\item Network - Retransmission of sensor data of a rogue BS
	\item Network - Blocking Data transmission of a rogue BS
	\item Rogue BS Sensor Data aggregation
	\item Rogue BS Sensor data modifiacation before transmission
\end{itemize}
\section{Trust and Security}
Differentiation between trust and security --- and the problem that not everyone is using that right.
\section{Systems of Trust}
All trust systems are built on the standards of Trusted Computing Group.
\subsection{Secure Boot, TXT, \ldots}
Trusted Boot is not the same as Secure Boot. Explain the difference
\subsection{TPM1.2}
Initial Version of the Cryptocoprocessor, successfully spread into many systems, but hardly any integration in Trust/security Software

\subsection{TPM2.0}
Current Version (published 2014) with some improvements.
\begin{itemize}
	\item Hierarchies
	\item Endorsement Key
	\item Attestation Identity Key
	\item Key management
\end{itemize}

\section{Integrity Measurements}
Extend the Chain of Trust beyond the boot process.
The Kernel can measure many different types of Resources.
What is a useful set of measurements

\section{Verify Trust (DA and DAA)}
Use the TPM to proof trustwothiness to other instances like the PIA